“从模仿者到自主创新”《中国经济发展研究报告》(三)-pg电子麻将胡了
china is rapidly becoming a leading innovator in advanced industries译文简介
什么是创新?
正文翻译

what is innovation?
one reason why it has been difficult to answer the question, “how innovative is china?” is that there are multiple definitions of what it means for an economy to be “innovative.” some equate it with doing well in innovation-based industries, even if that output is largely based on copying from leaders in other nations. others argue it is strong performance in a variety of innovation metrics, such as patents, r&d, and venture capital (vc), even though these metrics are correlated with innovation but are not determinative. still others argue that it is a nation’s firms gaining market share in first-to-the-world (or near-first-to-the-world) products and services. for the purposes of this report, it is this third definition that is most relevant because it is key to determining whether china can do more than copy and because even strong innovation metrics are not necessarily a sign of true innovation performance.
什么是创新?
“中国创新能力如何?”这个问题很难回答,原因之一是对一个经济体“创新”的定义有很多。有些人认为创新就是在创新型行业中表现良好,即使这种产出很大程度上是抄袭其他国家的领先者。另一些人认为创新是指在专利、研发和风险资本 (vc) 等各种创新指标上表现强劲,尽管这些指标与创新相关,但并非决定性因素。
还有一些人认为创新是指一个国家的企业在世界首创(或接近世界首创)产品和服务方面获得市场份额。就本报告而言,第三个定义最为相关,因为它是确定中国是否能做得比抄袭更多的关键,而且即使是强大的创新指标也不一定代表真正的创新表现。
another factor that can complicate the analysis is whether process or product innovation is the measure. process innovation—developing and adopting new ways of producing a good or service—is an important factor in increasing labor productivity (e.g., output per labor hour), and that is key to being able to effectively compete with low-wage economies.
另一个使分析复杂化的因素是,衡量标准是过程创新还是产品创新。过程创新——开发和采用生产商品或服务的新方法——是提高劳动生产率(例如,每小时劳动产出)的一个重要因素,这是能够有效地与低工资经济体竞争的关键。
另一个使分析复杂化的因素是,衡量标准是过程创新还是产品创新。过程创新——开发和采用生产商品或服务的新方法——是提高劳动生产率(例如,每小时劳动产出)的一个重要因素,这是能够有效地与低工资经济体竞争的关键。
product innovation refers to new and better products (and services). it enables higher-wage economies to compete on the basis of goods that do not compete largely on costs. for example, new pharmaceuticals can be priced higher than older generics if they provide better treatment. new 5-nanometer (nm) computer chips cost more than older 20 nm chips, but because of superior performance will often outcompete the older generations. patent protection, trade secrets, and other knowledge advantages can provide somewhat sustainable advantages over lower-cost rivals.
产品创新是指新的和更好的产品(和服务)。它使高工资经济体能够在不以成本为主要竞争基础的商品上展开竞争。例如,如果新药能提供更好的治疗效果,其价格可以高于旧仿制药。
新的 5 纳米 计算机芯片比旧的 20 纳米芯片成本更高,但由于性能优越,通常会胜过老一代芯片。专利保护、商业秘密和其他知识优势可以提供相对于低成本竞争对手的某种可持续优势。
产品创新是指新的和更好的产品(和服务)。它使高工资经济体能够在不以成本为主要竞争基础的商品上展开竞争。例如,如果新药能提供更好的治疗效果,其价格可以高于旧仿制药。
新的 5 纳米 计算机芯片比旧的 20 纳米芯片成本更高,但由于性能优越,通常会胜过老一代芯片。专利保护、商业秘密和其他知识优势可以提供相对于低成本竞争对手的某种可持续优势。
however, product innovation is not very important if the innovation cannot be brought to market successfully. this requires adequate quality, a competitive cost structure, and a viable business model. as clay christensen pointed out in the innovator’s dilemma, it’s not enough to be successful in generating new ideas.9 even technological breakthroughs can become a dead end unless they can be translated into working products that are able to be delivered and deployed into the larger marketplace. what we really want to determine is china’s innovative capabilities as they relate to being early in bringing new products to widespread market adoption.
然而,如果创新不能成功推向市场,产品创新就不是很重要。这需要足够的质量、有竞争力的成本结构和可行的商业模式。正如克莱·克里斯坦森在《创新者的窘境》中指出的那样,仅仅成功产生新想法是不够的。
即使是技术突破,如果不能转化为能够交付并部署到更大市场的实用产品,也可能成为死路。我们真正想要确定的是中国的创新能力,因为这与早期将新产品推向广泛市场有关。
然而,如果创新不能成功推向市场,产品创新就不是很重要。这需要足够的质量、有竞争力的成本结构和可行的商业模式。正如克莱·克里斯坦森在《创新者的窘境》中指出的那样,仅仅成功产生新想法是不够的。
即使是技术突破,如果不能转化为能够交付并部署到更大市场的实用产品,也可能成为死路。我们真正想要确定的是中国的创新能力,因为这与早期将新产品推向广泛市场有关。
finally, at one end are innovations that are transformative. the invention of nylon, the television, the first transistor, radar, and the personal computer are in this category. at another end are ideas that many other companies are already executing. this is why one factor in innovation is differentiating between breakthrough (sometimes termed exceptional, radical, or disruptive) innovations (e.g., the iphone) and sustaining innovations (sometimes called incremental or continuous), such as a new generation of semiconductors that has higher performance than the current generation.10 for example, consider the drivetrain of cars. the development by tesla of the electric drivetrain was a breakthrough innovation. the development of a better electric motor that uses a small percentage less electricity is an incremental innovation, or what is termed sustaining innovation. most innovation is sustaining, as companies seek to improve capabilities in existing markets and where they have a clear idea of what problems need to be solved. disruptive innovations such as the iphone are relatively rare and often usually relatively quickly enter into a stage of incremental innovation (e.g., better battery life, better displays, better cameras).
最后,一端是变革性创新。尼龙的发明、电视、第一个晶体管、雷达和个人电脑都属于这一类。另一端是许多其他公司已经在实施的创意。这就是为什么创新的一个因素是区分突破性(有时称为卓越、激进或颠覆性)创新(例如 iphone)和持续性创新(有时称为增量或持续),例如性能高于当前一代的新一代半导体。例如,考虑汽车的传动系统。特斯拉开发的电动传动系统是一项突破性创新。
开发一种使用耗电更少的、更好的电动机是一种增量创新,或称为持续性创新。大多数创新都是持续性的,因为公司寻求提高现有市场的能力,并且他们清楚地知道需要解决哪些问题。像 iphone 这样的颠覆性创新相对罕见,而且通常相对较快地进入增量创新阶段(例如,更长的电池寿命、更好的显示器、更好的相机)。
最后,一端是变革性创新。尼龙的发明、电视、第一个晶体管、雷达和个人电脑都属于这一类。另一端是许多其他公司已经在实施的创意。这就是为什么创新的一个因素是区分突破性(有时称为卓越、激进或颠覆性)创新(例如 iphone)和持续性创新(有时称为增量或持续),例如性能高于当前一代的新一代半导体。例如,考虑汽车的传动系统。特斯拉开发的电动传动系统是一项突破性创新。
开发一种使用耗电更少的、更好的电动机是一种增量创新,或称为持续性创新。大多数创新都是持续性的,因为公司寻求提高现有市场的能力,并且他们清楚地知道需要解决哪些问题。像 iphone 这样的颠覆性创新相对罕见,而且通常相对较快地进入增量创新阶段(例如,更长的电池寿命、更好的显示器、更好的相机)。
disruptive innovation is perhaps the most threatening to companies. blackberry did not go out of business because the iphone was a similar phone with a better physical keyboard; it went out of business because the iphone and the business model that went along with it (including the app store) was disruptive. the milk glass bottle industry did not go out of business because someone made slightly lighter glass bottles; it went out of business because paperboard cartons and then plastic bottles provided much better value.
颠覆性创新对企业而言也许是最具威胁性的。黑莓之所以破产,并不是因为 iphone 是一款类似的手机但配备了更好的物理键盘,而是因为 iphone 及其伴随的商业模式(包括应用商店)具有颠覆性。牛奶用玻璃瓶行业之所以破产,并不是因为有人制造了更轻的玻璃瓶;而是因为纸板箱和塑料瓶提供了更好的价值。
颠覆性创新对企业而言也许是最具威胁性的。黑莓之所以破产,并不是因为 iphone 是一款类似的手机但配备了更好的物理键盘,而是因为 iphone 及其伴随的商业模式(包括应用商店)具有颠覆性。牛奶用玻璃瓶行业之所以破产,并不是因为有人制造了更轻的玻璃瓶;而是因为纸板箱和塑料瓶提供了更好的价值。
in summary, innovation is not invention. it is not science. it is not necessarily entrepreneurship. it is bringing to market new products or services at scale. in addition, while that part of innovation is critical, so is its widespread diffusion and adoption, and so is the process of technology innovation.
总之,创新不是发明。这不是科学。这不一定是企业家精神。它正在大规模地向市场推出新产品或服务。此外,虽然创新的这一部分是至关重要的,但它的广泛传播和采用,以及技术创新的过程也是如此。
总之,创新不是发明。这不是科学。这不一定是企业家精神。它正在大规模地向市场推出新产品或服务。此外,虽然创新的这一部分是至关重要的,但它的广泛传播和采用,以及技术创新的过程也是如此。
the asian tiger path
one reason to be on the affirmative side of “can china innovate?” is that it is attempting to follow well-worn paths other developing asian economies have followed to become innovation leaders. as linsu kim wrote in his definitive 1997 history of south korean innovation upgrading, imitation to innovation: the dynamics of korea’s technological learning, there are several distinct stages a nation that is catching up to the leaders in innovation usually takes. the first involves the transfer of foreign technology to that nation—sometimes by foreign direct investment (fdi), sometimes by licensing, and often, as in the case of china, by theft or pressure on foreign firms seeking to sell in the market. the second stage involves “the effective diffusion of imported technology within an industry and across industries” which “is a second sequence in upgrading technological capability of an economy.”11 the third stage “involves local efforts to assimilate, adapt, and improve imported technology and eventually to develop one’s own technology. these efforts are crucial to augmenting technology transfer and expediting the acquisition of technological capability. technology may be transferred to a firm from abroad or through local diffusion, but the ability to use it effectively might not be there. this ability can only be acquired through indigenous technological effort.”
亚洲小虎之路
对“中国能创新吗?”持肯定态度的一个原因是,中国正试图追随其他亚洲发展中国家成为创新领导者的既有路径。正如林洙·金(linsu kim)在其 1997 年出版的韩国创新升级史权威著作《从模仿到创新:韩国技术学习的动力》中所写,一个国家在赶上创新领导者的过程中通常会经历几个不同的阶段。
第一阶段涉及外国技术向该国的转让——有时是通过外国直接投资,有时是通过许可,而在中国,通常是通过盗窃或向寻求在市场上销售的外国公司施压。
第二阶段涉及“进口技术在行业内和行业间的有效传播”,这是“经济技术能力升级的第二个序列”。第三阶段“涉及当地努力吸收、适应和改进进口技术,并最终开发自己的技术。这些努力对于加强技术转让和加快技术能力的获取至关重要。
技术可能从国外或通过本地传播转移到一家公司,但可能不具备有效利用该技术的能力。这种能力只能通过本土技术努力获得。”
one reason to be on the affirmative side of “can china innovate?” is that it is attempting to follow well-worn paths other developing asian economies have followed to become innovation leaders. as linsu kim wrote in his definitive 1997 history of south korean innovation upgrading, imitation to innovation: the dynamics of korea’s technological learning, there are several distinct stages a nation that is catching up to the leaders in innovation usually takes. the first involves the transfer of foreign technology to that nation—sometimes by foreign direct investment (fdi), sometimes by licensing, and often, as in the case of china, by theft or pressure on foreign firms seeking to sell in the market. the second stage involves “the effective diffusion of imported technology within an industry and across industries” which “is a second sequence in upgrading technological capability of an economy.”11 the third stage “involves local efforts to assimilate, adapt, and improve imported technology and eventually to develop one’s own technology. these efforts are crucial to augmenting technology transfer and expediting the acquisition of technological capability. technology may be transferred to a firm from abroad or through local diffusion, but the ability to use it effectively might not be there. this ability can only be acquired through indigenous technological effort.”
亚洲小虎之路
对“中国能创新吗?”持肯定态度的一个原因是,中国正试图追随其他亚洲发展中国家成为创新领导者的既有路径。正如林洙·金(linsu kim)在其 1997 年出版的韩国创新升级史权威著作《从模仿到创新:韩国技术学习的动力》中所写,一个国家在赶上创新领导者的过程中通常会经历几个不同的阶段。
第一阶段涉及外国技术向该国的转让——有时是通过外国直接投资,有时是通过许可,而在中国,通常是通过盗窃或向寻求在市场上销售的外国公司施压。
第二阶段涉及“进口技术在行业内和行业间的有效传播”,这是“经济技术能力升级的第二个序列”。第三阶段“涉及当地努力吸收、适应和改进进口技术,并最终开发自己的技术。这些努力对于加强技术转让和加快技术能力的获取至关重要。
技术可能从国外或通过本地传播转移到一家公司,但可能不具备有效利用该技术的能力。这种能力只能通过本土技术努力获得。”
the final stage is to become a global innovation leader. as kim wrote:
firms in catching-up countries that have successfully acquired, assimilated, and sometimes improved mature foreign technologies may aim to repeat the process with higher-level technologies in the transition stage in advanced countries. many industries in the first tier of catching-up countries (e.g., taiwan and [south] korea) have arrived at this stage. if successful, they may eventually accumulate indigenous technological capability to generate emerging technologies in the fluid stage and challenge firms in the advanced countries.
最后阶段是成为全球创新领导者。正如金写道:
追赶型国家中成功收购、吸收并有时改进成熟的外国技术的企业,可能会试图在发达国家转型阶段用更高级的技术重复这一过程。第一梯队追赶型国家/地区(例如台湾(地区)和韩国)的许多行业已经到达这一阶段。如果成功,他们最终可能会积累本土技术能力,在流动阶段产生新兴技术,并挑战发达国家的企业。
firms in catching-up countries that have successfully acquired, assimilated, and sometimes improved mature foreign technologies may aim to repeat the process with higher-level technologies in the transition stage in advanced countries. many industries in the first tier of catching-up countries (e.g., taiwan and [south] korea) have arrived at this stage. if successful, they may eventually accumulate indigenous technological capability to generate emerging technologies in the fluid stage and challenge firms in the advanced countries.
最后阶段是成为全球创新领导者。正如金写道:
追赶型国家中成功收购、吸收并有时改进成熟的外国技术的企业,可能会试图在发达国家转型阶段用更高级的技术重复这一过程。第一梯队追赶型国家/地区(例如台湾(地区)和韩国)的许多行业已经到达这一阶段。如果成功,他们最终可能会积累本土技术能力,在流动阶段产生新兴技术,并挑战发达国家的企业。
china is following this recipe/path, with its first step being to attract foreign investment. in the early 1980s, when d opened up the chinese economy to foreign investment, his main economic development strategy sought principally to induce foreign multinationals to shift relatively low- and moderate-value production to china.
中国正在遵循这一处方/道路,第一步就是吸引外资。
20 世纪 80 年代初,邓小平向外资开放中国经济,他的主要经济发展战略主要是吸引外国跨国公司将相对低价值和中等价值的生产转移到中国。
中国正在遵循这一处方/道路,第一步就是吸引外资。
20 世纪 80 年代初,邓小平向外资开放中国经济,他的主要经济发展战略主要是吸引外国跨国公司将相对低价值和中等价值的生产转移到中国。
china’s second step was to attempt to learn from foreign companies, in part by having them train chinese executives, scientists, and engineers, and also by forced technology transfer, including through joint ventures. in 2015, 6,000 new international joint ventures, amounting to $27.8 billion in fdi inflows, were established in china.15 and the sophistication and value of the technology the chinese government has demanded is high. as the united states trade representative’s (ustr’s) office pointed out in its 2018 special 301 report on china, pressures on u.s. companies to form joint ventures and transfer technology “is particularly intense.”
中国的第二步是试图向外国公司学习,一方面让它们培训中国高管、科学家和工程师,另一方面强制技术转让,包括通过合资企业。2015 年,中国成立了 6,000 家新的国际合资企业,外国直接投资流入量达 278 亿美元。中国政府要求的技术的复杂程度和价值都很高。正如美国贸易代表办公室 (ustr) 在其 2018 年对华特别 301 报告中指出的那样,美国公司成立合资企业和转让技术的压力“特别大”。
中国的第二步是试图向外国公司学习,一方面让它们培训中国高管、科学家和工程师,另一方面强制技术转让,包括通过合资企业。2015 年,中国成立了 6,000 家新的国际合资企业,外国直接投资流入量达 278 亿美元。中国政府要求的技术的复杂程度和价值都很高。正如美国贸易代表办公室 (ustr) 在其 2018 年对华特别 301 报告中指出的那样,美国公司成立合资企业和转让技术的压力“特别大”。
the third step was to support chinese companies in their efforts to copy and incorporate foreign technology while building up domestic capabilities. one important marker for the transition from stage two to stage three was the publication in 2006 of the “national medium- and long-term program for science and technology development (2006–2020),” which called on china to master 402 core technologies—everything from intelligent automobiles to integrated circuits and high-performance computers. china moved to a “china inc.” development model of indigenous innovation, which focused on helping chinese firms, especially those in advanced, innovation-based industries, often at the expense of foreign firms.
第三步是支持中国企业在建设国内技术能力的同时,复制和吸收国外技术。从第二阶段过渡到第三阶段的一个重要标志是2006年发布的《国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要(2006-2020年)》,该规划要求中国掌握402项核心技术——从智能汽车到集成电路和高性能计算机。中国转向自主创新的“中国公司”发展模式,重点是帮助中国企业,尤其是那些处于先进创新型行业的企业,而这往往是以牺牲外国企业为代价的。
第三步是支持中国企业在建设国内技术能力的同时,复制和吸收国外技术。从第二阶段过渡到第三阶段的一个重要标志是2006年发布的《国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要(2006-2020年)》,该规划要求中国掌握402项核心技术——从智能汽车到集成电路和高性能计算机。中国转向自主创新的“中国公司”发展模式,重点是帮助中国企业,尤其是那些处于先进创新型行业的企业,而这往往是以牺牲外国企业为代价的。
the fourth and final step is to enable chinese firms to become independent innovators—as japan, singapore, south korea, and taiwan have all become. china is attempting to do this through an array of plans and policies: “13th five-year plan for science and technology,” “13th five-year plan for national informatization,” “the national cybersecurity strategy,” and “made in china 2025 strategy,” and most recently ***’s call at the 20th party congress for “invigorating china through science and education ... for the strategy of innovation-driven development.”
第四步也是最后一步,让中国企业成为自主创新者——就像日本、新加坡、韩国和台湾(地区)都已成为的那样。中国正试图通过一系列计划和政策来实现这一目标:“十三五科技规划”、“十三五国家信息化规划”、“国家网络安全战略”和“中国制造2025战略”,以及最近中国领导人在中共二十大上提出的“科教兴国……实施创新驱动发展战略”。
第四步也是最后一步,让中国企业成为自主创新者——就像日本、新加坡、韩国和台湾(地区)都已成为的那样。中国正试图通过一系列计划和政策来实现这一目标:“十三五科技规划”、“十三五国家信息化规划”、“国家网络安全战略”和“中国制造2025战略”,以及最近中国领导人在中共二十大上提出的“科教兴国……实施创新驱动发展战略”。
the last part of this is to then support these companies “going out” and taking market share in other parts of the world. unfortunately, for gaining political support for a robust u.s. strategy to respond to china, the united states is among the last places chinese firms will seek to enter. rather, they are going after market share in places such as latin america, southeast asia, africa, and eastern europe, the “soft underbelly” of global markets. as their firms gain market share, western—including u.s.—firms, lose market share, and tipping points can happen quite quickly.
最后一步是支持这些公司“走出去”,在世界其他地区抢占市场份额。不幸的是,为了获得美国强有力的反华战略的政治支持,美国是中国公司最不愿意进入的地方之一。相反,他们正在争取拉丁美洲、东南亚、非洲和东欧等全球市场的“软肋”的市场份额。随着他们的公司获得市场份额,西方公司(包括美国公司)的市场份额就会下降,临界点可能很快就会出现。
(未完待续)
最后一步是支持这些公司“走出去”,在世界其他地区抢占市场份额。不幸的是,为了获得美国强有力的反华战略的政治支持,美国是中国公司最不愿意进入的地方之一。相反,他们正在争取拉丁美洲、东南亚、非洲和东欧等全球市场的“软肋”的市场份额。随着他们的公司获得市场份额,西方公司(包括美国公司)的市场份额就会下降,临界点可能很快就会出现。
(未完待续)
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we have a huge amount of stem already particularly me. maybe you mean we need to suppress stem wages or something but we don’t have a shortage. frankly if we wanted more stem we should create more pathways for tradesmen to become engineers.
up: 15
我们(美国)已经有了大量的stem(理工)人才,尤其是me(数学和工程)人才。也许你的意思是我们需要抑制stem工资或其他什么,但我们不存在短缺。坦率地说,如果我们想要更多的stem,我们应该为技工成为工程师创造更多的途径。
at my job in the semiconductor industry, we've had to make operators into engineers. their experience and skill set you don't learn in undergrad, and lately it's been more valuable than a degree due to the older generation retiring. strangely, practical experience is in short supply.
up: 12
我在半导体行业工作时,我们必须把操作员培养成工程师。他们的经验和技能是你在大学里学不到的。
最近,由于老一辈的退休,他们的经验和技能比学位变得更有价值了。奇怪的是,实际经验缺乏。
sounds about right, now if management would do that more often we would be in business
up: 8
听起来是对的,现在如果管理层经常这样做,我们就可以走上正轨了。
good luck fixing education in us, when project 2025 is trying to pull us in a theocracy. it would take decades to fix us education even if there's any initiative which there aren't.
there's an easy solution. require chinese companies to form 50/50 jvs just like how they required the west to set up auto industry in china. us gets ip transfer and jobs. china gets access and more profits. consumers get cheaper and better goods.
alas, the us billionaires don't want competition. so both parties sell bs something about overcapacity and geopolitical conflicts. tells everyone to hate and fear the chinese. average americans lose.
up: 88
当 2025 项目试图将美国拉入神权政治时,祝你们在解决美国的教育问题方面好自为之。即使有任何倡议,解决美国教育问题也需要几十年的时间,更何况实际上并没有。
有一个简单的pg电子麻将胡了的解决方案——要求中国公司组建 50/50 的合资企业,就像他们要求西方在中国建立汽车工业一样。美国获得知识产权转让和就业机会。中国获得准入和更多利润。消费者获得更便宜、更好的商品。
唉,美国亿万富翁不想竞争。所以两党都在兜售产能过剩和地缘政治冲突的废话。告诉每个人要憎恨和害怕中国人。
但最终输的是普通美国人。
won't be enough, you can source pretty much all american innovations to bell labs and xerox parc
both closed down due to not being "directly profitable"
there simply isn't a desire to innovate because rent-seeking is simply the superior investment
up: 75
这还不够,你可以把几乎所有的美国创新都外包给贝尔实验室和施乐帕洛阿尔托研究中心。
由于没有“直接盈利”,两家机构都倒闭了。
他们根本没有创新的欲望,因为寻租只是一种更好的投资。
there's an easy solution. require chinese companies to form 50/50 jvs just like how they required the west to set up auto industry in china. us gets ip transfer and jobs. china gets access and more profits. consumers get cheaper and better goods.
the problem with this idea is that the us and us companies don't actually want to grow their industrial sector, so they probably don't view the prospect of doing joint ventures with china as something positive.
in fact, the economical mainstream theory in the west seems to be that having an economy being mainly driven by the service sector is the best thing there is, so in their view there is no reason to even try and reindustrialize to the point where they can compete with china.
up: 27
这个想法的问题在于,美国和美国公司实际上并不想发展其产业,因此他们可能不认为与中国建立合资企业的前景是件好事。
事实上,西方的主流经济理论似乎认为,以服务业为主要驱动力的经济是最好的,因此在他们看来,没有理由尝试再工业化到可以与中国竞争的程度。
in addition to just having factories. you have to have the infra to support it.
many companies including apple said factories and cheap labor isnt the only thing atttactive about manufacturing in china, its the entire package: consistent infrastructure is key.
thats why india and veitnam isnt going to catch up soon.
also, china bad, cheap and behind is pretty much ingrained in the american mainatream media. even if china agrees to doing jv( which theyll 100% be ok with), the us government going yo say this is.going to be natioanl.security concern.
ametica is far too deep witj their head up their ass.
up: 27
除了建造工厂,你还必须有基础设施来支持它。包括苹果在内的许多公司表示,工厂和廉价劳动力并不是中国制造业的唯一吸引力,而是整个因素:想匹配的基础设施是关键。
这就是为什么印度和越南不会很快赶上来。
此外,中国糟糕、廉价和落后的形象在美国主流媒体中根深蒂固。即使中国同意建立合资企业(他们100%同意),美国政府也会说这会引起国家安全问题。
美国人太自以为是了。